Ipeelee/Ladue and the Conundrum of Indigenous Identity in Sentencing by Gevikoglu, Jeanette
The Supreme Court Law
Review: Osgoode’s Annual
Constitutional Cases
Conference
Volume 63 (2013) Article 9
Ipeelee/Ladue and the Conundrum of Indigenous
Identity in Sentencing
Jeanette Gevikoglu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Gevikoglu, Jeanette. "Ipeelee/Ladue and the Conundrum of Indigenous Identity in Sentencing." The Supreme Court Law Review:
Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 63. (2013).
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol63/iss1/9
  
 
Ipeelee/Ladue and the Conundrum of 
Indigenous Identity in Sentencing 
Jeanette Gevikoglu* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in R. v. Ipeelee/ 
Ladue1 is an opportunity to revisit the critiques of R. v. Gladue2 and to 
consider whether the sentencing of indigenous offenders under section 
718.2(e) of the Criminal Code3 is the best means to alleviate the 
historical injustice and systemic discrimination indigenous people 
associate with the criminal justice system. The law has always 
distinguished indigenous people from other Canadians on the basis of 
their identity. For instance, defined benefits flow from the meaning of 
“Indian” within the meaning of the Indian Act4 and constitutional rights 
flow from the meaning of “aboriginal” in the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.5 Indigenous identity certainly has come to matter in the 
criminal justice system, which articulates particular accommodation for 
“Aboriginal” offenders when determining a fit sentence in accordance 
                                                                                                             
* Jeanette Gevikoglu is a lawyer at the Public Prosecution Service of Canada. This work was 
prepared separately from the author’s employment responsibilities at the Public Prosecution Service of 
Canada. The views, opinions and conclusions expressed herein are personal to the author and should 
not be construed as those of the Public Prosecution Service of Canada or the federal Crown. 
1 [2012] S.C.J. No. 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ipeelee/Ladue”]. 
2 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gladue”]. 
3 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter “Criminal Code”]. 
4 R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. 
5 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. See, e.g., Indian Act, id.; Re Eskimos, [1939] S.C.J. No. 5, 
[1939] S.C.R. 104 (S.C.C.); Canada (Attorney General) v. Lavell, [1971] F.C.J. No. 28, 22 D.L.R. 
(3d) 188 (F.C.A.); Manitoba Métis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] S.C.J. 
No. 14, 291 Man. R. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.). 
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with section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code.6 In Ipeelee/Ladue, the 
Supreme Court revisits section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code and 
considers its application to the sentencing of indigenous offenders 
breaching long-term supervision orders (“LTOs”). The Court reaffirms its 
decision in R. v. Gladue and ultimately both Ladue and Ipeelee receive 
consideration for their status as indigenous offenders.  
On its face, Ipeelee/Ladue may be considered a success for advocates 
for indigenous offenders. Specifically, the decision means that the princi-
ples the Court articulated in Gladue are a mitigating factor in sentencing 
indigenous offenders, even those who breach an LTO. Although the nar-
row issue is important, more interesting is how the Court construes 
indigenous identity in the sentencing of indigenous offenders. The crimi-
nal law, as Ipeelee/Ladue demonstrates, uniquely particularizes 
indigenous identity as a factor that must have weight in sentencing in-
digenous offenders — regardless of the offence, the victim, or the link 
between the offender and his or her indigenous community. The decision 
demonstrates the dilemma courts face in their efforts to remedy the his-
toric injustice and systemic discrimination indigenous people suffered in 
the criminal justice system through accommodating indigenous differ-
ence. Ipeelee/Ladue shows that the Court is mindful of the challenges 
adjudicating indigenous offenders’ claim to historical disadvantage and 
systemic discrimination pose. The decision does little, however, to probe 
how sentencing law plays a part in constructing indigenous identity in 
the law and what that means to the goal of 718.2(e): the mitigation of the 
historic injustice and systemic discrimination that makes up part of the 
indigenous experience of criminal law. Although the response to the de-
cision has renewed interest in the practicalities of sentencing indigenous 
offenders, it remains one confined to solutions within the framework of 
criminal law rather than a broader consideration of indigenous communi-
ties’ relationship with the state.  
To explore the implications of particularizing indigenous identity in 
Gladue, it is important to consider the facts of the case, which I set out in 
the next part of this paper. Then, I place Ipeelee/Ladue within context as 
the most recent decision in a line of jurisprudence and legislative 
initiatives aimed at remedying indigenous communities’ negative 
experience of the criminal justice system. Next, I consider how 
                                                                                                             
6 Note that for the purpose of s. 718.2(e), the meaning of “aboriginal” is broader than the 
Indian Act and includes “at least, all who come within the scope of s. 25 of the Charter and s. 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982”: Gladue, supra, note 2, at para. 90.  
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Ipeelee/Ladue demonstrates that making use of indigenous identity in 
sentencing poses a conundrum for the criminal justice system. I conclude 
by considering whether there is a way to confront the conundrum of 
indigenous identity in sentencing.  
II. THE BACKGROUND OF IPEELEE/LADUE 
The background of the offenders and the offences at issue in 
Ipeelee/Ladue are familiar to many criminal lawyers working in indige-
nous communities. Both Manasie Ipeelee and Frank Ladue were 
sentenced to penitentiary sentences and designated long-term offenders 
subject to an LTO upon their release. A long-term offender designation is 
given to individuals convicted of certain enumerated offences or a “seri-
ous personal injury offence”7 whom the court deems likely to re-offend 
based on evidence offered during sentencing (such as a psychiatric as-
sessment or criminal history). If a sentencing court finds an individual to 
be a “long-term offender”, it imposes an LTO of up to 10 years after the 
individual completes his or her penitentiary sentence, during which that 
individual is under the jurisdiction of the parole board. 
1. Manasie Ipeelee 
Manasie Ipeelee, an Inuit offender, was living in the Kingston area 
bound by an LTO. He was born in Iqaluit, Nunavut. His mother was an 
alcoholic and died of exposure when Ipeelee was quite young. He began 
consuming alcohol at the age of 11 and became an alcoholic. He alleged 
he was sexually abused as a child. Ipeelee was raised by his grandpar-
ents, but at the time of his LTO hearing he was estranged from his family 
in Iqaluit. Many close members of his family had died while he was in 
custody on previous sentences. Ipeelee was living in the Kingston area 
because there was no Community Correctional Centre in Nunavut that 
could accept him.8 
                                                                                                             
7 A “serious personal injury offence” is defined in s. 752 of the Criminal Code and 
includes certain enumerated offences, like sexual assault, as well as offences a court finds “use or 
attempt use of violence” and/or involves “conduct that endangered or is likely to endanger life, 
safety of another person or inflict or is likely to inflict severe psychological harm”. 
8 Ipeelee/Ladue, supra, note 1, at paras. 2-3; R. v. Ipeelee, [2009] O.J. No. 5402, 99 O.R. 
(3d) 419, at para. 14 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Ipeelee CA”]; see also the appellant’s and 
respondent’s factums filed in Ipeelee/Ladue online: <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca>. 
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In 1999 Ipeelee committed the predicate offence resulting in the im-
position of the LTO in Yellowknife when he violently sexually assaulted 
a 50-year-old homeless woman. He served the entirety of his six-year 
sentence for that offence and commenced his LTO in March 2007. Prior 
to the charges for breaching his LTO that brought his case to the Supreme 
Court, Ipeelee’s LTO had been suspended four times. In August 2008, the 
Kingston police found him riding a bicycle, intoxicated, and also pos-
sessing two bottles of alcohol. He was charged with breaching a 
condition of his LTO that required abstention from alcohol. He pleaded 
guilty to that offence on November 14, 2008 and was sentenced to three 
years’ imprisonment. At his sentencing, the judge found his Aboriginal 
status to be of diminished importance in the context of the case, a deter-
mination that formed one of the grounds of Ipeelee’s appeal to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal, who upheld the sentence. The Ontario Court of 
Appeal agreed that the sentencing judge should have taken Ipeelee’s Inuit 
status into account, but found that the sentence was nonetheless fit.9 
Ipeelee subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court. 
2. Frank Ladue 
Frank Ladue is a member of the Ross River Dena Council Band in 
Yukon Territory, part of the Kaska nation. Ladue’s parents had problems 
with alcohol abuse and died when he was young; his mother may have 
been murdered. He was raised by his grandparents, who lived a tradi-
tional life on the land. From the age of five until nine, he attended 
residential school, where he alleged he was the subject of abuse. The ex-
perience of residential school for members of the Ross River Dena 
community was documented in the pre-sentence report tendered at La-
due’s sentencing. Much like Manasie Ipeelee, his criminal record was 
related to intoxicants, and he began using illicit drugs while in the federal 
penitentiary. He was characterized as a “serial sex offender”.10 
Ladue was convicted of break and enter and sexual assault in 2002 
when he sexually assaulted a 22-year-old woman passed out in a house. 
He was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment and a seven-year LTO. 
                                                                                                             
9 Ipeelee CA, id. 
10 Ipeelee/Ladue, supra, note 1, at paras. 19-25; R. v. Ladue, [2011] B.C.J. No. 366, [2011] 
2 C.N.L.R. 277, at paras. 5-11 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Ladue CA”]; R. v. Ladue [2010] B.C.J. 
No. 2824, 2010 BCPC, at paras. 18-23 (B.C.P.C.) [hereinafter “Ladue PC”]; see also appellant’s and 
respondent’s factums filed in Ipeelee/Ladue online: <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca>. 
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His LTO commenced in December 2006. It was suspended three times, 
and he had just finished serving a sentence for one of these suspensions 
in August 2009 when he was arrested on an outstanding DNA warrant. 
As a result of that arrest, he lost his place in Linkage House, a placement 
in Kamloops where he received the support of an indigenous elder, and 
was released instead to Belkin House in downtown Vancouver. Shortly 
after that placement in Vancouver, he provided a urinalysis that tested 
positive for cocaine. He pleaded guilty to breaching his LTO in February 
2010 and was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, a sentence longer 
than the 18 months to two years requested by the Crown. Ladue appealed 
his sentence on the basis that the sentencing judge failed to consider his 
Aboriginal status. The majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
allowed his appeal, reducing the sentence to one year. Justice Chaisson, 
in dissent in the result, would have imposed a sentence of two years. The 
Attorney General of British Columbia appealed to the Supreme Court.11 
3. Ipeelee/Ladue in the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court heard Ipeelee’s and Ladue’s cases together. Jus-
tice LeBel, writing for the majority, allowed Ipeelee’s appeal, reducing 
his sentence to one year. Similarly, the majority dismissed the appeal of 
the Attorney General of British Columbia and upheld the decision of the 
majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal to reduce Ladue’s sen-
tence to one year. Justice Rothstein dissented on the question of whether 
protection of the public was the paramount principle in sentencing indi-
viduals who breach LTOs, but he agreed with the majority’s approach to 
sentencing indigenous offenders. Justice Rothstein also dissented in the 
result, finding both appeals should have been dismissed. 
The decision reviews the principles of sentencing in the Criminal 
Code and the provisions of the Corrections and Conditional Release 
Act12 that govern LTOs. In particular, it reviews how judges should ap-
proach the determination of a fit sentence for indigenous offenders who 
breach LTOs.13 The decision was critical of the line of LTO-breach sen-
tencing decisions that emphasized protection of the public over 
rehabilitation of offenders.14 It was apparent from the decision and the 
                                                                                                             
11 Ipeelee/Ladue, id.; Ladue CA, id., at paras. 13-15; Ladue PC, id., at paras. 13-25. 
12 S.C. 1992, c. 20. 
13 Ipeelee/Ladue, supra, note 1, at para. 34. 
14 Id., at paras. 49-54. 
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questions directed at counsel during the hearing of the appeal, that the 
Court was concerned with the possibility that lengthy penitentiary sen-
tences for an LTO would effectively convert that LTO into a dangerous 
offender designation.15 The Court did not decide the case merely on that 
basis, however. The decision goes on to re-examine the principles that 
should govern the sentencing of indigenous offenders and applies them 
to the case.  
Justice LeBel revisited Gladue and the legislative history of 718.2(e) 
of the Criminal Code, which requires specific consideration of the cir-
cumstances of indigenous offenders. He considers and dismisses 
critiques of Gladue and ultimately reaffirms the need to consider Abo-
riginal status in sentencing. He attempts to “make sense of aboriginal 
sentencing” and evaluate the existing approach to sentencing of indige-
nous offenders.16 He then applies the principles discussed to Ipeelee’s 
and Ladue’s circumstances. The Court finds that in sentencing Ipeelee, 
the lower courts erred in principle by making protection of the public the 
paramount principle of sentencing and giving attenuated consideration to 
Ipeelee’s status as an Inuit offender. It concludes that, given Ipeelee’s 
history of drinking since age 11, “relapse is to be expected as [Ipeelee] 
continues to address his addiction”.17 With respect to Ladue, the Court 
determined that the judgment of the majority of the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal was “well founded” and that the court was correct to 
intervene on the basis that inadequate consideration was given to Ladue’s 
status as an indigenous offender.18  
III. WHY THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF  
INDIGENOUS OFFENDERS? 
The Court’s reasoning in Ipeelee/Ladue reflects an approach to 
sentencing indigenous offenders that makes use of those offenders’ 
indigenous identity. The concern with indigenous identity stems from 
Canada’s troubled history of accommodating indigenous difference, 
especially in the criminal justice system. That troubled history provides 
important context for understanding how Ipeelee/Ladue is both an 
                                                                                                             
15 Id., at para. 37; Hearing of Ipeelee/Ladue, Supreme Court Webcast, online: <http://scc-
csc.gc.ca.>.  
16 Ipeelee/Ladue, id., at paras. 64-79. 
17 Id., at para. 92. 
18 Id., at para. 97. 
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affirmation of 718.2(e) and by extension provides a place for Canada’s 
indigenous people in the criminal justice system. Section 718.2(e) 
requires judges to consider the “particular circumstances of indigenous 
offenders”. The amendment came about as a result of advocacy by and on 
behalf of indigenous people that sought to curb over-incarceration of 
indigenous offenders and to mitigate the historical disadvantage and 
systemic discrimination offenders experienced in the criminal justice 
system. 
Indigenous offenders make up a disproportionate number of those 
incarcerated in Canada’s prisons, a fact most recently confirmed in the 
report of the Office of the Correctional Investigator.19 Various reports 
commissioned by parliamentary, legislative or committee inquiries 
document this indigenous experience and characterize the Canadian 
criminal justice system as a failure for indigenous people.20 These cri-
tiques of the criminal justice system tend to revolve around: (1) over-
representation of indigenous Canadians in the criminal justice system, 
particularly in jails;21 (2) failure of the criminal justice system to deal 
with the social and economic dislocation that is often related to crime;22 
                                                                                                             
19 Office of the Correctional Investigator, Spirit Matters: Aboriginal People and the 
Corrections and Conditional Release Act (October 22, 2012), online: <http://www.oci-
bec.gc.ca/rpt/oth-aut/oth-aut20121022-eng.aspx>. 
20 See, e.g., Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report of the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples, Looking Forward, Looking Back, vol. 1 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 
1991) [hereinafter “RCAP”]; A.C. Hamilton & C.M. Sinclair, Report of the Aboriginal Justice 
Inquiry of Manitoba (Winnipeg: Queen’s Printer, 1991) [hereinafter “Manitoba Justice Inquiry”]; 
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on Aboriginal 
People and the Criminal Justice System in Canada (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services 
Canada, 1996) [hereinafter “Bridging the Cultural Divide”]; Richard Gosse, Roger Carter & James 
Youngblood Henderson, Continuing Poundmaker and Riel’s Quest: Presentations Made at a 
Conference on Aboriginal Peoples and Justice (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 1994) [hereinafter 
“Continuing Poundmaker and Riel’s Quest”]; Task Force on the Criminal Justice System and its 
Impact on the Indian and Metis People of Alberta, Justice on Trial: Report of the Task Force on the 
Criminal Justice System and its Impact on the Indian and Metis People of Alberta (Edmonton: The 
Task Force on the Criminal Justice System, 1991). 
21 See, e.g., Bridging the Cultural Divide, id., at 28-33; Larry Chartrand & Celeste McKay, 
A Review of Research on Criminal Victimization and First Nations, Metis, and Inuit Peoples 
(Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2006), online: Department of Justice <http://www.justice.gc.ca/ 
eng/pi/rs/rep-rap/2006/rr06_vic1/index.html>; “Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics Profile Series: 
Aboriginal Peoples in Canada” (Ottawa: Ministry of Industry, 2001), at 6-11; Manitoba Justice 
Inquiry, id. 
22 See, e.g., Rick Linden, “Crime Prevention in Aboriginal Communities”, Consultation 
Paper for Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba (Winnipeg: Queen’s Printer, 1991); 
Murray Sinclair, “Aboriginal Peoples, Justice, and the Law” [hereinafter “Sinclair”] in Continuing 
Poundmaker and Riel’s Quest, supra, note 20, at 173-75; Dawn Y. Andersen, After Gladue: Are 
Judges Sentencing Aboriginal Offenders Differently? (Ph. D. Dissertation: York University, 2003), 
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(3) lack of indigenous perspectives in the criminal justice system; and 
(4) the sense of illegitimacy and oppression most indigenous Canadians 
associate with the criminal justice system.23  
The numerous government inquiries and reports into the failure of 
the Canadian criminal justice system for indigenous people also direct 
criticism at the lack of political power and legal authority indigenous 
communities suffer in their experience of criminal justice. The reports of 
the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples and the Manitoba Justice 
Inquiry, in particular, called on the federal government to respond to the 
charge that the criminal justice system fails indigenous people in Can-
ada.24 The Royal Commission on Aboriginal People’s report on criminal 
justice outlined how the criminal justice system accounted for part of the 
historic disadvantage and oppression indigenous people in Canada have 
suffered.25 The Commission rejected “indigenization”26 of the criminal 
justice system, which was already taking place with court workers and 
diversion, and any reform that targeted cultural awareness without 
changing the political framework of the criminal justice system.27 The 
Manitoba Justice Inquiry recommended that the federal government sup-
port the establishment of indigenous systems of justice to empower 
indigenous communities and to ensure that the criminal justice system 
applies indigenous law.28 About the criminal justice system, the late 
Patricia Monture once commented, “[t]he legal system is at the heart of 
                                                                                                             
at 2 and 5 [hereinafter “Andersen”]; Kent Roach & Jonathan Rudin, “Gladue: the Judicial and 
Political Reception of a Promising Decision” (July 2000) Can. J. Crim. 355, at 358-59 [hereinafter 
“Roach & Rudin”]; Sanjeev Anand, “The Sentencing of Aboriginal Offenders, Continued Confusion 
and Persistent Problems: A Comment on the Decision in R. v. Gladue” (July 2000) Can. J. Crim. 
412, at 416 [hereinafter “Anand”]. 
23 See, e.g., Bridging the Cultural Divide, supra, note 20, at xi, 7; Sinclair, id.; Patricia 
Monture, “Thinking About Aboriginal Justice: Myths and Revolution” [hereinafter “Monture”] in 
Continuing Poundmaker and Riel’s Quest, supra, note 20, at 222; Roach & Rudin, id., at 376.  
24 Andersen, supra, note 22, at 5-6; Roach & Rudin, id., at 358, 379.  
25 David Stack, “The Impact of Gladue on the Judiciary: Bringing Aboriginal Perspectives 
into the Courtroom” (1999) 62:2 Sask. L. Rev. 471, at 477; Bridging the Cultural Divide, supra, note 
20, at 1-25. 
26 Indigenization refers to the practice of maintaining state and post-colonial structures but 
with indigenous staff and programs. For example, Tammy Landau describes the indigenization of 
corrections practices: “where Aboriginal workers (for example, probation and parole officers) and 
programs (for example, sweat lodges and healing circles) are integrated into existing correctional 
practices, either at the institutional or community level”. See Tammy C. Landau, “Plus Ca Change?: 
Correcting Inuit Inmates in Nunavut, Canada” (2006) 45:2 The Howard Journal 191.  
27 Bridging the Cultural Divide, supra, note 20, at 40-53. 
28 See the recommendations for Aboriginal justice systems in Chapter 17 of the report of the 
Manitoba Justice Inquiry: Manitoba Justice Inquiry, supra, note 20.  
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what we must reject as aboriginal nations and Aboriginal individuals”.29 
Monture advocated for indigenous people in Canada to be given “both 
the resources and the control to address the many problems that our 
communities now face”. She was fierce in advocating that indigenous 
people be allowed to apply those resources and that control in accordance 
with indigenous legal traditions.30 Thus, it is partly as a result of advocacy 
for political power and authority that section 718.2(e) was born. 
Section 718.2(e) came into effect in 1996 when Bill C-41 amended the 
sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code. The comprehensive amend-
ments included an expression of principles and purposes to direct judges in 
sentencing, as well as new sentencing options and rules of evidence for 
sentencing hearings. The principles and purposes of sentencing reflected in 
sections 718, 718.1 and 718.2 of the Code were intended to codify existing 
judicial principles of sentencing and emphasize more the remedial aspects 
of the rationale for sentencing.31 Bill C-41 signalled “Parliament’s interest 
in the restorative justice objectives of reparation for harm done to victims 
and the community and in promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders 
and the harm done to victims in the community”.32  
Most important for indigenous communities was that the reforms 
added section 718.2(e), requiring “particular attention to the circum-
stances of aboriginal offenders” in the consideration of “all available 
sanctions other than imprisonment”. The particular attention Parliament 
directed at indigenous offenders in 718.2(e) reflected the concerns about 
the over-representation of indigenous offenders in the Canadian criminal 
justice system. At the first meeting of the Standing Committee hearings 
on Bill C-41, the Hon. Allan Rock, then Minister of Justice, spoke to the 
Committee about section 718.2(e):  
The reason we referred specifically there to aboriginal persons is that 
they are sadly overrepresented in the prison populations of Canada. ... 
Nationally, aboriginal persons represent about 2 percent of Canada’s 
                                                                                                             
29 Monture, supra, note 23, at 223. 
30 Id., at 224. 
31 Department of Justice, Backgrounder on Sentencing Reform (August 28, 1996), online: 
Department of Justice <http://web.archive.bibalex.org/web/19980116184537/canada.justice.gc.ca/ 
News/Communiques/1996/chap22_bkg_en.html>; Andrew Welsh & James Ogloff, “Progressive 
Reform or Maintaining the Status Quo?: An Empirical Evaluation of the Judicial Consideration of 
Aboriginal Status in Sentencing Decisions” (July 2008) Can. J. of Crim. 491, at 493. 
32 David Daubney & Gordon Parry, “An Overview of Bill C-41 (The Sentencing Reform 
Act)” in Julian V. Roberts & David P. Cole, eds., Making Sense of Sentencing (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1999) 31, at 34. 
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population, but they represent 10.6 percent of persons in prison. 
Obviously, there’s a problem here. 
What we’re trying to do, particularly having regard to the initiatives in 
the aboriginal justice communities to achieve community justice, is to 
encourage courts to look at alternatives where it’s consistent with 
protection of the public — alternatives to jail. ...33 
The reports on sentencing leading up to Bill C-41 supported creating 
alternatives to imprisonment for indigenous offenders. The Law Reform 
Commission specifically supported diversion measures, victim-offender 
reconciliation for indigenous offenders, and codifying the recommenda-
tion for diversion. The basis for those recommendations was the premise 
that “rehabilitation and reconciliation are important for aboriginal com-
munities”.34 As Sanjeev Anand writes, “it is indisputable that 
s. 718.2(e)’s purpose is to help ameliorate the serious problem of over-
representation of aboriginal people in prisons, and to encourage 
sentencing judges, where appropriate, to have recourse to a restorative 
approach to sentencing”.35 Thus, section 718.2(e) symbolized a constitu-
tional and socio-legal compromise: a space within the criminal justice 
system for indigenous legal approaches.  
In practice, however, section 718.2(e) functions primarily in criminal 
courts applying Canadian criminal law. The Criminal Code does not specify 
what constitutes “particular circumstances of aboriginal offenders”. That 
task has been left to the courts, particularly sentencing judges. The Su-
preme Court has defined the “particular circumstances of aboriginal 
offenders” in a way that relies on the notion of indigenous difference and 
considers indigenous identity a factor to be negotiated and accommodated 
                                                                                                             
33 House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on 
Justice and Legal Affairs in Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 35th Parl., 1st Sess., Vol. 144, 
No. I-62 (November 17, 1994) (Hon. Allan Rock). It is worth noting that the First Nations 
communities appearing before the Standing Committee discussed how they viewed s. 718.2(e) as a 
tool to develop Aboriginal justice systems: House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and 
Evidence of the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs in Official Report of Debates 
(Hansard), 35th Parl., 1st Sess., Vol. 144, No. I-79 (February 14, 1995) (Blaine Favel); House of 
Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal 
Affairs in Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 35th Parl., 1st Sess., Vol. 144, No. I-88 (March 2, 
1995) (Ovide Mercredi). 
34 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Aboriginal Peoples and Criminal 
Justice: Equality, Respect and the Search for Justice (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 
1991), at 70; Michael Jackson, “In Search of the Pathways to Justice: Alternative Dispute Resolution 
in Aboriginal Communities” (1992) 26 U.B.C. L. Rev. 141, at 170-87 [hereinafter “Jackson”]. 
35 Anand, supra, note 22, at 416. 
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in the sentencing process, as Gladue and Ipeelee/Ladue demonstrate. 
That is why indigenous difference mattered for Manasie Ipeelee and 
Frank Ladue. Their identity as indigenous offenders is the rationale for 
taking into account their particular circumstances in sentencing. 
Ipeelee/Ladue is an example of how criminal courts are called on daily to 
remedy the historic disadvantage and systemic discrimination that led to 
the implementation of section 718.2(e) in the first place. The case reveals 
that, in practice, performing that task creates a new framework for crimi-
nal law’s differential treatment of indigenous offenders. 
IV. A COURTROOM CONUNDRUM: IPEELEE/LADUE AND  
THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 718.2(e) 
Using individual identity as a factor in sentencing is not unique to 
indigeneity. Sentencing is a process that requires law take up the question 
of individual identity, always assessing and evaluating the quality of the 
individual, “the circumstances of the offender”, and weighing them 
against the crime before the court, “the circumstances of the offence”.36 
If an individual’s circumstances are always before a sentencing judge, 
why then should the mandated consideration of indigenous identity con-
cern us? It should concern us because the concept of indigenous identity 
has already been mobilized by the state and the criminal justice system in 
ways we decry as harmful.  
The law was a tool in colonialism. To this day, legal language defines 
indigeneity: “Indian”, “Eskimo”. The law criminalized indigenous politi-
cal and cultural activities, and regulated who could take up land, attend 
school or access government resources.37 In remote areas of the country, 
criminal justice was often the first and most dominant aspect of the  
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Canadian state with which indigenous people had contact.38 Articulating 
how indigenous communities experience disempowerment and historical 
disadvantage in the legal system, John Borrows writes: “[p]ut simply, the 
continent’s original inhabitants have never been convinced that the rule 
of law lies at the heart of their experiences with others in this land.”39 
The legacy of that colonial history remains: the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Canada, ongoing land claims negotiations, the Idle No 
More movement and the disproportionate number of indigenous people 
involved with the criminal justice system. 
1. Essentializing Indigenous Communities 
The way the Court depicts indigenous identity in Ipeelee/Ladue cre-
ates a framework for differential treatment of indigenous offenders that is 
problematic. The problem is revealed in the way that the Court construes 
and then dismisses the critiques of Gladue. The Court is mindful of the 
challenges of adjudicating indigenous offenders’ claims to historical dis-
advantage and systemic discrimination. It engages some critiques of the 
application of Gladue, namely that: (1) sentencing is not an appropriate 
means of addressing over-representation; (2) the Gladue principles pro-
vide what is essentially a race-based discount for Aboriginal offenders; 
and (3) the sentences for indigenous offenders are disparate. 
Ipeelee/Ladue dismisses these critiques almost out of hand. The Court 
pays little attention, for instance, to what effects differentiating offenders 
on the basis of indigenous identity has for indigenous communities. The 
particularized focus on indigenous identity takes on a character that sub-
sumes other considerations, including differences within indigenous 
communities and the purpose behind the implementation of  
section 718.2(e). Indeed, it is this particularization with which Rothstein J., 
in part, takes issue, declaring: “Aboriginal communities are not a separate 
category entitled to less protection because the offender is Aboriginal.”40 
His comment reflects the statistical reality of high crime rates in indige-
nous communities. Statistics are especially stark in remote communities, 
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such as Iqaluit, where “the volume and severity of police-reported crime 
were found to be highest in the territories, particularly in the Northwest 
Territories and Nunavut”.41 The Court does little to address how particu-
larizing indigenous identity as a determinative factor in sentencing — 
regardless of the offence, the victim, or the link between the offender and 
his or her indigenous community — could create a category of commu-
nity that receives less protection from the law. If anything, it is 
dismissive of the idea, selectively drawing an inflammatory quote from 
the legislative history of 718.2(e): 
Why should an Aboriginal convicted of murder, rape, assault or of 
uttering threats not be liable to imprisonment like any other citizen of 
this country? Can we replace all this with a parallel justice, an ethnic 
justice, a cultural justice? Where would it stop? Where does this horror 
come from?42  
Framing the concern about community protection in this manner sug-
gests that intolerance is the source of this critique of Gladue. It ignores 
the question of whether indigenous communities themselves have the 
impression that they are the subject of “race-based” sentencing. It fails to 
consider the indigenous critics and communities that have taken issue 
with section 718.2(e) and the approach espoused in Gladue.  
The diversity of indigenous communities and their engagement in 
sentencing is an unexplored factor in Ipeelee/Ladue. Indigenous commu-
nities, which are multiple, varied, rich and diverse in cultural and legal 
traditions, are all meant to be encompassed in the reference to “Aborigi-
nal”. The effect essentializes indigenous identity. “Essentialism” refers to 
the idea that individuals who share the same characteristics possess a 
shared, constant biological nature or essence, or “ascribe to group mem-
bers a common experience of oppression that is culturally and 
historically invariable”.43 Essentialism is especially problematic when 
institutions of authority, within and outside a group, define rights and 
benefits on the basis of a set of closed characteristics meant to define that 
group’s identity.44 Theorists and advocates of identity politics alike have 
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wrestled with the issue of essentialism.45 In the context of sentencing 
indigenous offenders, essentializing indigenous identity creates a conun-
drum. Section 718.2(e) was meant to alleviate discrimination and historic 
disadvantage. Essentializing indigenous identity, even in the service of 
remediating the circumstances of particular offenders, puts the criminal 
courts in a quandary. It calls into question whether the implementation of 
section 718.2(e) can ever respond to what indigenous advocates and crit-
ics of the criminal justice system called for: power and autonomy for 
indigenous people in the criminal justice system.  
The Court’s characterization of indigenous identity also calls into 
question the role the criminal justice system plays for indigenous offend-
ers. The needs of the communities or offenders are constructed in a way 
that characterizes the indigenous person being sentenced as victimized 
by systemic and direct discrimination, suffering from dislocation, and 
substantially affected by poor social and economic conditions. 
Ipeelee/Ladue not only makes such comparisons in the case of Frank 
Ladue and Manasie Ipeelee,46 but also states: 
Canadian criminal law is based on the premise that criminal liability 
only follows from voluntary conduct. Many Aboriginal offenders find 
themselves in situations of social and economic deprivation with a lack 
of opportunities and limited options for positive development. While 
this rarely — if ever — attains a level where one could properly say 
that their actions were not voluntary and therefore not deserving of 
criminal sanction, the reality is that their constrained circumstances 
may diminish their moral culpability.47 
Although Ipeelee and Ladue suffered deprivation as individuals, the 
Court treats their context not as “circumstances of the offender” in the 
same way it might other offenders who lack opportunity or suffer disad-
vantages. Rather, the Court connects Ipeelee’s and Ladue’s social and 
economic deprivations to their identity as indigenous offenders and 
moves from that connection to a broader generalization about indigenous 
offenders as a category. Section 718.2(e) is of course the foundation for 
the differentiation of indigenous offenders, but the Court’s decision still 
draws the difference in a way that enforces traditional power imbalances 
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between indigenous people and the state. The Court’s decision has the 
effect of inferring diminished moral culpability on an offender by virtue 
of his or her indigenous identity. It places indigenous offenders in a simi-
lar position as others for whom the assignation of responsibility is a 
problem, such as the mentally ill or youth. It is important to consider the 
impact that both appropriating indigenous identity and essentializing that 
identity as victimized, dislocated and poor has on indigenous communi-
ties’ and offenders’ agency in the sentencing process. The state becomes 
a kind of trustee for indigenous people, tasked with remedying the disad-
vantage Gladue describes. The irony is, of course, that part of the 
disadvantage indigenous offenders suffered was as a result of past poli-
cies and institutions that the state implemented as a self-declared trustee 
for indigenous people.  
2. Essentializing Indigenous Legal Perspectives: Dismissing the 
Concerns of “Race-Based” Sentencing 
Ipeelee/Ladue indicates that the Court is aware of the dangers of es-
sentialism, making reference to criticism that refers to section 718.2(e) as 
“race-based” sentencing.48 Nonetheless, the Court dismisses this concern. 
The dismissal glosses over more profound concerns that critics have ex-
pressed regarding the sentencing framework that Gladue laid out for 
indigenous offenders. The first concern was that there would be disparate 
sentences for indigenous offenders or that less punitive sentences would 
endanger the community, as many indigenous communities already suf-
fered from high crime rates.49 The decision also attracted criticism from 
feminists who argued that the decision’s emphasis on restorative justice 
practice overlooked the gender dimensions of crime and victimization in 
Aboriginal communities.50 Finally, it faced the critique that decisions 
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made under the framework essentialize indigenous people and indige-
nous culture in a way that reinforces historical stereotypes.51  
The Court essentializes indigenous identity in a way that can per-
petuate problematic stereotypes that were the basis for asserting 
sovereignty over indigenous people and appropriating indigenous iden-
tity in the first place. Ipeelee/Ladue reflects how courts set indigenous 
legal perspectives up in opposition to the criminal justice system: 
The Gladue principles direct sentencing judges to abandon the 
presumption that all offenders and all communities share the same 
values when it comes to sentencing and to recognize that, given these 
fundamentally different world views, different or alternative sanctions 
may more effectively achieve the objectives of sentencing in a 
particular community.52  
The Court thus places indigenous offenders in a position that is in 
contrast to the way sentencing principles normally operate in the Crimi-
nal Code. Unfortunately, the Court does not suggest that anything about 
the Inuit or Dena world view was particularly relevant to the Court’s ap-
proach to sentencing repeat sex offenders who breach court orders, like 
Ipeelee or Ladue. The Court openly acknowledges that “sentencing will 
not be the sole — or even the primary — means of addressing Aboriginal 
overrepresentation in penal institutions”; but the Court maintains, quot-
ing Gladue, that sentencing options other than jail can play “a stronger 
role in restoring a sense of balance to the offender, victim, and commu-
nity, and in preventing future crime”.53 Ipeelee/Ladue does not, however, 
include a discussion of these options. In fact, although making the argu-
ment that the consideration of sentencing options need not result in more 
lenient custodial sentences, the Court then goes on to find that what is 
appropriate for Ipeelee and Ladue is a more lenient custodial sentence.  
To determine what the Court means by these different “world 
views”, it is perhaps necessary to look to what Gladue articulates about 
Aboriginal justice. The Court’s view of the way indigenous identity 
should be conceived of in the sentencing process is exemplified in this 
excerpt from Gladue: 
When evaluating these circumstances in light of the aims and principles 
of sentencing as set out in Part XXIII of the Criminal Code and in the 
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jurisprudence, the judge must strive to arrive at a sentence which is just 
and appropriate in the circumstances. By means of s. 718.2(e), 
sentencing judges have been provided with a degree of flexibility and 
discretion to consider in appropriate circumstances alternative 
sentences to incarceration which are appropriate for the aboriginal 
offender and community and yet comply with the mandated principles 
and purpose of sentencing. In this way, effect may be given to the 
aboriginal emphasis upon healing and restoration of both the victim and 
the offender.54 
The Court sees indigenous traditions as healing traditions, taking a 
firm approach in characterizing indigenous law as primarily restorative.55 
The decision describes restorative justice as: 
an approach to remedying crime in which it is understood that all things 
are interrelated and that crime disrupts the harmony which existed prior 
to its occurrence, or at least which it is felt should exist. The 
appropriateness of a particular sanction is largely determined by the 
needs of the victims, and the community, as well as the offender.56 
In this way, a restorative justice approach becomes the indigenous world 
view and accordingly part of the Gladue sentencing model.  
In the application of Gladue, therefore, indigenous tradition is 
formulated and set up in contrast, and even in contradiction, to the unitary 
values of the Canadian criminal justice system; Canada’s criminal justice 
system is depicted as “retributive” whereas indigenous models of justice 
are depicted as “restorative”. Len Sawatsky, for instance, has characterized 
the Canadian criminal justice system in exactly such an oppositional way.57 
Rupert Ross’s work depicting his understanding of indigenous difference 
also relies on the notion that indigenous people have an understanding of 
dealing with crime that contradicts principles of the Canadian criminal 
justice system.58 Michael Jackson lays out a framework for indigenous 
justice systems that parallels the idea that indigenous legal systems are 
restorative or reconciliatory; his purpose is to show that the recognition of 
indigenous legal systems complements the way that the Canadian criminal 
justice system is moving — toward remedial measures and rehabilitation. 
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He summarizes the series of reports and inquiries that recommended 
changes to Canada’s sentencing process and argues that the recommended 
changes complement indigenous legal systems’ approach to crime.59 I 
point this out not because I oppose remedial measures or restorative 
justice, but because characterizing indigenous traditions as oppositional to 
the Canadian criminal justice system is problematic for a number of 
reasons. First, equating indigenous culture and law with restorative justice 
incorrectly conflates indigenous legal systems with Western notions of 
restorative justice.60 Restorative justice allows for ideas of “diversion” or 
“sentencing circles” to exist within the criminal justice system rather than 
mandating the creation of a different criminal justice system for indigenous 
people. Canadian criminal justice authorities, like police or Crown 
prosecutors, decide who may be diverted or how the sentencing circle is 
constituted. By conflating indigenous legal systems with the idea of 
restorative justice that deals with indigenous offenders through diversion 
in the Criminal Code’s process of sentencing, the criminal justice system 
remains the site in which to negotiate indigenous cultural difference. 
Indigenous communities must fit themselves into the spaces the criminal 
justice system creates in sentencing and acquiesce to the same sentencing 
process that historically appropriated indigenous identity for the purpose of 
asserting sovereignty. The logic, procedures and language of sentencing 
remain that of the state, with limited autonomy in the process for 
indigenous people. 
Second, it is also problematic to assume that a Dena or Inuit, or any 
indigenous legal approach, currently exists separate and apart from the 
experience of colonialism and criminal justice. In fact, to assume a con-
ception and identification of any indigenous tradition separate and apart 
from the experience of colonialism may not be possible. Emma Larocque 
argues that “typologizing Aboriginal cultures results in gross generaliza-
tions, draws on stereotypes, reduces Aboriginal culture to a pitiful 
handful of ‘traits’, and by oversimplifying, ends up infantilizing the very 
cultures Aboriginal people are trying to build up in the eyes of coloniz-
ers”.61 Larocque makes an argument about gender that is a good example 
of the problematic stereotyping that essentializing indigenous identity 
creates. She argues that gender is often at the heart of what becomes ty-
pologized as indigenous tradition and that typologizing frequently creates 
                                                                                                             
59 Jackson, supra, note 34. 
60 See, e.g., Monture, supra, note 23; Larocque, supra, note 50. 
61 Larocque, id. 
(2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) IPEELEE/LADUE AND THE CONUNDRUM 223 
new problems around gender and what is “authentically” indigenous. She 
asserts that that notion of justice and the role of women in indigenous 
societies in relation to criminal justice “is actually syncretized fragments 
of Native and Western tradition which have become highly politicized 
because they have been created from the context of colonization”.62 
Larocque’s concern was in fact one brought to the attention of the 
Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs in its consideration of 
Bill C-41 by the Pauktuutit Inuit Women’s Association of Canada.63 The 
way gender engages questions of culture serves as an example of the 
problematic way that the dichotomized notions of “traditional” and 
“Western” justice manifest themselves in public discourse about criminal 
law as it affects indigenous people. Most troubling perhaps is that all 
indigenous traditions become conflated in some vague way, not only with 
restorative justice models, but also with each other. In the very effort to 
create a more profound understanding with indigenous people and to make 
up for colonialism’s legacy and law’s essentialization of indigenous identity, 
a new essentialism emerges. The new essentialism comes with a different 
legal language, but it remains part of the state’s effort to ameliorate the 
circumstances of indigenous people. 
V. CONCLUSION: WHAT TO MAKE OF THE “PERILS” OF  
MAKING USE OF INDIGENOUS IDENTITY IN SENTENCING 
Indigenous identity is a conundrum for criminal justice. That conun-
drum lies partly in the context in which indigenous identity has become a 
part of our sentencing regime and partly in our expectations of what the 
criminal justice system can achieve through sentencing. In 
Ipeelee/Ladue, the Court is aware that sentencing is not a panacea for the 
ills that indigenous communities suffer as a result of historical disadvan-
tage and systemic discrimination. Nonetheless, the Court must act, and 
its action directly affects indigenous people. As a result, it has tried to 
develop an approach to action that could alleviate over-incarceration and 
systemic discrimination against indigenous offenders, but that approach 
also operates to construct indigenous identity. The law’s troubled legacy 
of regulating indigenous difference is not eliminated; it merely takes a 
different form. Criminal law continues to be a site of tension between 
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indigenous people and the state. The claims of indigenous people for au-
thority over the criminal justice system can only be articulated through 
the logic and procedures of the Criminal Code. It is a logic for which 
sentencing is particularly well suited, given its propensity to use an indi-
vidual offender’s character and identity to determine the extent of 
criminal responsibility, as well as its role in upholding the state’s author-
ity. But sentencing is not well suited to the task of remedying the historic 
disadvantage and systemic discrimination that indigenous people have 
experienced. 
What other options are available to criminal courts? Indeed, what 
other avenues are available for indigenous people? What would lessen 
the conundrum of the “perils of identity”64 that face criminal courts and 
indigenous offenders in the sentencing process? One way to address the 
conundrum courts face would be for the criminal justice system to ac-
knowledge the way that sentencing has the power to essentialize 
indigenous identity and exacerbate rather than alleviate the harm caused 
by systemic discrimination and historical disadvantage. That acknowl-
edgment would require practitioners engaged in the criminal justice 
system to look closely at how they characterize indigenous offenders, 
communities and indigenous legal perspectives. Reconciling ourselves to 
the conundrum takes nothing away from the difficult and important work 
of indigenous advocates in the criminal justice system. Instead, the ac-
knowledgment would mean that advocacy must focus on better 
community engagement, better systems for diversion and better re-
sources for indigenous communities. Since Ipeelee/Ladue, there is a 
renewed interest in the sentencing of indigenous offenders. For instance, 
the University of Manitoba’s Faculty of Law has developed a “Gladue 
Handbook” to assist judges and lawyers involved in sentencing indige-
nous offenders.65 Debra Parkes has questioned how the Supreme Court’s 
emphasis on proportionality for indigenous offenders will conflict with 
Parliament’s recent legislative amendments instituting mandatory mini-
mum sentencing.66 Ipeelee/Ladue also supports arguments for giving 
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specific consideration to the circumstances of indigenous offenders in 
situations beyond sentencing, including extradition hearings, bail and 
challenges to prosecutorial discretion.67 Although renewed focus on the 
practicalities of sentencing indigenous offenders could result in better 
resources for indigenous individuals or communities, sentencing would 
remain a place where indigenous communities engage with the criminal 
justice system, and criminal courts would still need to confront the co-
nundrum of indigenous identity. 
A more profound response to the conundrum would be to return to 
the constitutional and socio-legal compromise that section 718.2(e) 
represents, and to find a space within the criminal justice system for in-
digenous legal approaches other than the sentencing process. Indigenous 
communities seek greater autonomy and control over the justice system 
that governs them. That is the reason why indigenous identity matters in 
sentencing. As such, it makes sense to consider whether a better ap-
proach to the conundrum lies in revisiting how our state deals with 
indigenous claims to autonomy and self-governance. Addressing indige-
nous claims to self-governance means looking to the multiplicity, 
diversity and richness of indigenous communities to find out what auton-
omy and self-governance means to them. It requires an ongoing 
engagement within communities and within our constitutional and legal 
institutions. It is a difficult task; however, it could be that within a consti-
tutional response to the conundrum there is in fact a remedy for the 
historic disadvantage and systemic discrimination indigenous people suf-
fered and in which the criminal justice system is implicated.  
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